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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HI:t;RY THOMAS ADAMS and HENRY 
THOMAS ADAMS, I I I, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs-
STEPHEN L. GUBLER, TED 
GUBLER, VENLA GUBLER, 
STEAMBOAT VISTA, INC., 
THE LESLIE \IILCOX FAMILY 
TRUST, LaPRELE G. ORTON, 
GLEN L. GUBLER and JEAN G. 
COX, Trustees of the 
LESLIE IJlLCOX FAMILY TRUST, 
Defendants and Respondents.) 
Case No. 19342 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiffs to 
establish a 15% interest in the real property subject of 
this lawsuit. Plaintiffs base their allegations on written 
contracts entered into with Stephen L. Gubler and Ted L. 
Gubler individually and as agents of the Defendant Steamboat 
Vista, Inc., and the Leslie \.Jilcox Family Trust. 
l1p1wlL:rnts' action is for specific performance. Essential 
l" the specific performance claim was reformation of certain 
documents to delete supposed conditions relating to (1) the 
sale of the subject property and (2) an interest in the 
1 
Defendant Steamboat Vista, Inc. In support (>1 1hc•i 1· 
argument of reformation and claim for specific l'E'I Lc.i:.::"' 
Appellants also sought to have the Leslie \lilcux Famil·,• 
Trust declared invalid and declared merely the alLer e~ 1,,. 
the Defendant Ted L. Gubler. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Fifth Judicial 
District Court, without a jury, on September 30, Octcih~r 
and October 2, 1981. On June 30, 1983, the court entered 
its judgment from which this Appeal is taken entering 
judgment against the Plaintiffs on all issues raiseu, u.icf 
that Defendants \·Jere ordered to return a $7 ,SOG <leposit to 
the Plaintiffs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPE.\L 
Appellants seek reversal of the trial courL', 
judgment entered against them on the grounds that tht 
court's Findings of Fact are unsupported by the evidence 
presented at trial and that on the basis of the evicle11cc r .. 
Appellants are entitled to a 157, interest in the subject 
real estate. Appellants also ask that the ca:~e )," rer."''' 
to the trial court for proceedings to pc:rtition tire 
property. 
2 ...1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Henry Thomas Adams and his son, Henry Thomas Adams 
JI!, hegan negotiations for the purchase of the subject real 
~•late in the early Fall of 1979. See Findings of Fact No. 
17. (Trial Transcript (hereafter TT) pages 27-29). Steven 
R. Carter, the real estate broker, advised Appellants and 
Gublers of the availability of the subject property. The 
size of the real estate (approximately 831 acres) and the 
amount of money involved in purchasing said real estate 
(approximately $840,000) precluded any one of the 
individuals of this action from purchasing the property 
outright by themselves. For that reason, the parties 
negotiated to pool their assets for the purpose of 
purchasing the property. Additional, outside, investors 
were also sought to participate in the investment. Each of 
the parties would, after purchase, have an undivided 
interest in the real estate. 
The negotiations continued through the Fall of 
197Q and intu the early Winter months of 1980. The Leslie 
Wilcox Family Trust initially negotiated purchase of the 
subiect property in its name on December 1, 1979. See 
l 111dillg of Fact No. 12 and Trial Exhibit No. 1. The 
i1p1wl l<rnts obtained a signed document from the manager of 
tlie Leo>lie Hilcox Family Trust, on or about January 2, 1980, 
l'l"<ll,:i sing to convey to the Appellants an undivided 157. 
interest in said property. Trial Exhibit No. 2 (included in 
th1· apjH:nclix) and Findings of Fact Nos. 19 and 20. 
3 
The parties plan continued l·Jith tht· cr,.;it i,,n ,,: 
corporation, Steamboat Vista, Inc. It was form"J fc,r rh,· 
purpose of purchasing the real e~;tate from the Leslie \iilc 
Family Trust. A contract was executed for the sale of the 
property from the trust to the corporation on or about 
December 5, 1979. Trial Exhibit No. 11 and Findin;:; of face 
No. 4 0. The con tract was signed by Stephen Cub ler and Toe, 
Adams in behalf of the corporation, although the corporJtior 
was not formally incorporated at that ti1:1e. Shares of stcci 
in the corporation were to be sold to the Leslie \lilcuc: 
Family Trust, to the Adams and to other investors. Tom 
Adams, Steven Carter and Stephen Gubler were instn.11;1ental 1· 
setting up the corporate entity. Stepheu Cub! er in behal; 
of the corporation executed stock purchase agrL·ernents in 
favor of Tom Adams and his son. Trial Exhibits r:os. S anc' 
(included in the appendix), Findings of Fact Nos. 32 and 11 
The stock Purchase Agreements contained a condicion that 
they were subject to the Board of Directors dpproval. Thi, 
condition was of no concern to Mr. Adams, as he and tir. 
Steve Carter 11ere to be on the Board of Directors. Stephu' 
Gubler also received $7,500.00 from the Adams, as a 
downpayment for said stock, or in the alternative, f•• 
portion of the downpayoenc for the property itscli uc"'' 
agreement with the trust. TT, Page 30, and F incl int; of Fae: 
No. 33. 
4 
Another investor, Everett Johnston, was found who 
nad sufficient capital to fund the remaining interest in the 
property. The Leslie Wilcox Family Trust sold a 50% 
interest to Everett Johnston. Finding of Fact No. 47. The 
Leslie Wilcox Family Trust then refused to sell any interest 
in the property to the Appellants. Trial Exhibit No. 8. The 
trust refused to perform its contract with Steamboat Vista, 
1nc., for the purchase of the property. Steamboat Vista, 
Inc., through its then Board of Directors (Ted Gubler, 
Stephen Gubler and Venla Gubler) refused to honor its 
cornmicment to the Appellants by transferring stock in said 
corpor<ltion to the Appellants. Trial Exhibit No. 7. The 
corporation also refused to enforce its contract to purchase 
the property from the trust. 
The Leslie Wilcox Family Trust was created by the 
Defendant Ted L. Gubler and his wife for the supposed 
benefit of their children. Findings of Fact Nos. 1 and 2. 
Ted L. Gubler transferred nearly all of his assets into said 
trust at the time of its creation. Findings of Fact No. 7. 
Teel L. Gubler remains the manager of said trust and handles 
ell of the day to day activities of the property of said 
lru,r. The original trustees were Jean Gubler Cox, Glen 
l .. 111IJ Gubler and Steven R. Carter. Finding. of Fact No. 3. 
The trustees during the period of October, 1979, through 
tLiy, 1980, were Jean Gubler Cox, Glen Laub Gubler and 
L~Prcle G. Orton. 
5 
Steamboat Vista, Inc., was proposed an<! toir,,, 
by the Defendant Stephen L. Gubler, the Appel l'lnt Tu1,, ,, 1,dl<. 
and the Appellants' broker Steven Carter. The corpora ti ,
1 
was formed to purchase the subject real property. T'f 
200-201. The corporation however was subsequently org2 Di 7c; 
with the Defendants Ted L. Gubler, Stephen L. Gubler and hl, 
wife Venla Gubler as directors and officers. Findiug r,f 
Fact No. 28, Trial Exhibit No. 12. 
At all times pertinent to the transactions 
involved in the instant lawsuit, the trustees of the Leslie 
Wilcox Family Trust were the brother and two sistets of the 
trustor and Defendant Ted L. Gubler. Stephen L. Gubler a~sc 
acted as an agent for the Leslie \Jilcox Fc1mily Trust durir, 6 
this period of time. Stephen L. Gubler is the son of Teo~, 
Gubler, the trustor. 
On March 10, 1980, the Adaris tendered additiu111l 
monies in the sum of $30, 300. 00 to Southern Utah Title 
Company to be held in escrow until the purchase of the 
subject property was closed. Trial Exhibit No. lS; TT PJt:co 
37 and 73. This amount represented the remainiug ha lance 
due for their 15% share of the downpayment on the prup~r< 
6 
ARG\J1'EUT 
l:'OlNT I: FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT ARE 
WITHOUT EVIDENTIARY FOUUDATION 
The factual findings on which the Court's ruling 
was based are unsupported in the evidence. The findings 
1.;hi ch act most affirmatively to defeat Plaintiffs• claim are 
those relating to the validity of the trust, and the 
trustees' acts, and the validity of the corporation. To 
facilitate reference to the Findings of Fact, they are 
reproduced in the Appendix. 
The true facts of this case support the 
application of legal doctrines which compel a result in 
Appellants favor: the facts regarding the nature of the 
trust support application of alter ego and fraudulent 
conveyance law to the trust, and defeat the "condition" of 
trustees' approval in Adams agreement with the trust for a 
15~ interest in the land. 
The true nature of the corporation compels the 
granting of specific enforcement of the stock subscription 
attd land purchase agreements. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs are entitled to 
11·1~usicion in their favor of a constructive trust on a 15% 
interest in the property. 
7 
Findings on Validity of Tru~t 
Several of the factual findings ot Lhc rrirll 
dealt with the alleged Leslie Wilcox Family Trust. 1o ~ 
of those factual findings, the Appellants take tssue, 
particularly in regards to Findings of Fact Nos. S, 6, 
11, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 25. These findings 
claim that the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust \1as a valid and 
existing trust from the time of its creation throughout the 
applicable period of time in question. They also indicace 
the trustees were in direct and exclusive control of the 
trust and its assei::s and that the truster's (Ted Cubler'sl 
activities as general manager and the truster~' son's 
activities as agent of the trust were of no consequence dS 
to the validity of the subject trust. The findings also 
indicate that the trustees were fully aware of all trust 
transactions and that they kept currently advised as to z, 1 
trust matters through the numerous meetings they helc1 • 
These findings are totally unsubstantiated and 
grossly in error. The trustor and Defendant, Ted L. Gub!e• 
had actual and direct control of all property Lbxl he 
originally conveyed to the trust. Any de a 1 i ngs Toe ;,J,1.'' 
had \vith Ted Gubler should be construed as if hl' ,·c1 • 
dealing with Ted Gubler in his personal capacity, 1•t ti• 1'· 
own personal property. 
8 
The stdternents of each of the former trustees who 
tc:;tified during this trial indicate that they did exactly 
and only what Ted Gubler told them to do. 
Testimony of Jean Cox, Supposed Trustee 
In her testimony, Jean Cox indicated that Ted 
Cubler did most of the leg work in regard to the trust 
assets and made most of the business arrangements and that 
she would merely pass judgment on whether she agreed with 
his decisions or not. (TT, Page 154). Specifically with 
regard to the real property in this lawsuit, Mrs. Cox 
indicated she oerely approved the purchase of the property 
in the name of the trust. She did not observe the property 
betore she signed the contract. She did not observe the 
property at any time. She stated that Ted or Stephen Gubler 
had recomu:e:1ded the property to her and that she thereafter 
signed the contract. (See TT, Pages 155, 156 and 157). 
Mrs. Cox subsequently stated that all negotiations, through 
the entire transactions in question, were conducted through 
Ted or Stephen Gubler and that the contracts she signed 
',,ur in,; this period of time were all upon the recommendation 
d eith1Cr Stephen or Ted Gubler. (TT, Page 161). 
Mrs. Cox was asked, "Have you ever gone against 
t Ii"' .rdvice or wishes of Ted Gubler, as a trustee." Mrs. Cox 
cL:ited "1 don't think so," (TT, Page 165, Lines 20-22). 
t!rs. Cox lacked knowledge of the trust and its workings. 
9 
She stated, "But I didn't understand the trust t hc1t 1 <i 1 
mean, the proceedings part of it." (TT, Pcigc l6J, 1 uic; 
and 5). She did not know if the trust had J balll: 
where a bank account was located if one existed. She die 
not think that a bank account had anything in it. She al;, 
did not know who paid the e}:penses of the trust (TT, Page 
163). 
It is also important to note that t!rs. Cox stil~ 
felt that the property was Ted Gubler's. In discussing wh;· 
Ted Gubler's relationship to the trust was she stated, 
"Well, actually he managed - - it was his property, 
actually, most of it was. The original propertiPs wete 
h . " lS. (TT, Page 161, Lines 19 and 20). With respect Lo(, 
home that allegedly belongs to the trust, but in which Ted 
Gubler resides she stated that Ted Gubler ha<l lived in t~Jc 
house "as long as he had had it". (TT, Page 163, Line 21) 
The testimony of the trial shoHed that Stephen Gubler actc~ 
as agent for the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust. Mrs. Cu~ 
stated in response to the question whether Stephen Gubler 
was an agent of the trust, "I don't think so." (TT, ~a;;e 
163, Line 1). 
10 .J 
Testimony o~ O:her "Trustees" 
Cler. Gubler, a fori7ler trustee of the Leslie Wilcox 
Far.ii 1 y Trust, 2pparently took a so:::ewhat more active role in 
the trust affairs, in that he actually walked over the 
particular property in question. Eowever, his testimony 
indicates that his position as trustee was merely as a 
figurehead and that he only did what Ted and Stephen Gubler 
wanted him to do. It was Ted or Stephen Gubler who 
presented each of the contracts during the applicable period 
of time to Glen for his signature. (TT, Page 173). 
According to Glen Gubler, Ted Gub:er was manager of the 
trust and initiated the buying and selling of trust 
property. \lhen asked if he served Elainly to ratify Ted 
Gubler's decision he stated, "\·iell, that and - - yeah, to 
ratify them, or if I so desire, not:." He subseqently stated 
that he had never disagreed with Ted Gubler in what Ted 
Gubler wanted to do with the trust property. (TT, Page 175, 
Lim·s 15-22). \:hen asked if Ted G;.i'ciler paid rent to the 
trust for the use of the residence, he responded, "That 
would hc: a little ridiculous wo·.il::ri't it?" and then, "No, he 
clo,·"1'r." (TT, Page 178, Lines 13-16.) Mrs. LaPrele Orton, 
fotiner trustee, was asked concerning Ted's duties as a 
1:1.indgcr and she stated, "Hell, oanage his businesses". (TT, 
\!"/'c' l '1 J, Line 18). 
11 
Both LaPrele Orton and Glen Gubler s1 ,itecd 1,, 1 , 
had been Ted Gubler who asked them to be t rus lee,, at p
1
, 
initiation of the trust and they honored his request. ',r_" 
also indicated that it had been Ted Gubler whu asLed rhei: 
step down from being trustees and once again, as they hes 
throughout the time they had been trustees, they did e:,act. 
what Ted Gubler told them to do, and they stepped d01m fr,y, 
being trustees. (TT, Page 171 and 190). 
Steve Carter, another former trustee, was the 0 ,,~ 
trustee to testify who was a not a direct relative of the 
Gubler family. In regards to what he did .:is a trustee 2 
portion of his testimony is recorded as follows: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
(TT, 
What were your duties as a trustee? 
I had none. I mean, J was never cn11C1cted 
Was there ever a meeting held? 
No. 
Did you sign any docu~ents? 
I signed a document that Ted brought by ~ 
office. 
How many times did you do that? 
Orice. 
Did you know the other trustees at that i 
Yes. I knew two of them. I kne\'i Jean C,"·' 
and I also knew Glen Gubler. 
Did you meet with Hrs. Cox or tlr. Gubler 
during that early period of tinw, six r1[)nth, 
or one year period of time? 
r~o. 11 
Page 118, Lines 5-18). 
Mr. Carter was then asked concerning the originul 
organization meeting of the trust and the purp0rrcd '1 "'' 
of that first meeting. His testimony is as follows: 
Q. Okay. Are you saying that it was nut tielu, 
that meeting was not held. 
12 
I 
l 
A. No. He just d=opped this by and I signed it. 
Q. I show you wtat - - well - -
A. I signed it but I wasn't present. I was 
doing it to facilitate Hr. Gubler." 
(TT, Page 135, Lines 11-16). 
Conduct o: Trust Business 
During the period of time in question the other 
trustees did not rreet frequeritly or formally to discuss any 
type of trust business. Glen Gubler indicated that during 
the period of time (negotiations surrounding the purchase of 
the subject real property) he thought they only met formally 
about three times. (TT, Page 174). However, there is no 
ev1d~nce that minutes were kept of any formal meetings 
during this period of time or during any of the prior years 
of the trusts existenc<:. Jean Cox was asked, "How often did 
you hold meetings as Truste.es?", she responded, "We didn't 
hold a lot of their .. " (TT, Page 165, Lines 6-7). Reportedly 
a trustees meeting was held on March 12, 1980, and supposed 
~inutes were kept at such meecing. An alleged copy of those 
minutes were sent to Tom Ada2s indicating that the trust had 
voted nut to sell him an interest in the subject property. 
Howev~r. the trustees, Jean Cox and Glen Gubler, testified 
th:H ~uch meeting \.:as never held and that Stephen Gubler had 
c,ir<1ply drawn up those minutes and had brought them to each 
cd the trustees for their signature prior to it being sent 
t l) l'ur~1 Adams. (See TT, Page 163, 164, and 184). 
13 
Perhaps Mr. Glen Gubler stated it best itt 
discussing their activities as trustees and the " . l!IE'C t- J 1,, 
that they held when he stated, 
1 think that most people as a family don't ~'eu 
too often as a fc;irmal meeting like that and b·in, 
down a gavel on it. We meet as brothers a~d ~ 
sisters and discuss things as they pertain to ic 
and we come to a conclusion. This is our 
meeting." (TT, Page 183, Lines 3-7). 
The only real meeting established in the testimcn. 
was held on or about May 10, 1980, to reaffirm the allev,ed 
minutes of their March 12, 19 8 0, meeting. Th is \<Jas of 
course, after this lawsuit had been initiated and after 
depositions of those parties had been taken. In regarrl; l'· 
the Hay 10th meeting, Stephen Gubler' s testimon; stales, 
"May 10th is when we finally had a - - May l 0th we had a 
formal meeting where this was reaffirmed." 
(TT, Page 212, Lines 6-8). Stephen Gubler herein is 
treating the trust and its property as though it wE're hio, 
just as his father has done throughout the duration of thi' 
trust. 
Dealings with "Trust" Property 
Ted Cubler stated that his duties in rer;ards tc• 
the assets of the trust didn't differ any from the tir.1e ,,h .. 
they were all held in his own name, before the cre.1• Lei• ' 
the trust, from the time after the trust was c rea t cc 1 , 
than he stated he had to go to the trustees to have thew 
.1ppr"ve or disa?prove his actions. (TT, Page 244). As has 
""''<! shmm the trustees never did disapprove any of Ted 
1.c.bler' s actio:-is. Mr. Ted Gubler also stated that he 
handled the day to day business of the trust and the day to 
day management decisions of the trust. (See TT, Page 245). 
l!r. Ted Gubler was fin ally asked, "And they (the trustees) 
always ratifiec'. and fairly well rubber stamped your 
recommendation." He answered, 
Hell, I wouldn't call them rubber stamped. They 
basically have agreed with what I wanted to do 
because they felt I was trying to do the very best 
I could for the beneficiaries. Call it what you 
will." (TT, Page 252, Lines 10-15). 
The record is clear that Tom Adams dealt solely 
and exclusively with Ted and Stephen Gubler in working out a 
viable way to purchase the subject real property. Mr. Adams 
negotiations were always with Hr. Ted Gubler or Stephen 
Gubler or Steven Carter. He never met with the trustees of 
the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust. (See TT, Page 44). Mr. 
Adams was merely interested in obtaining what he had 
bargained and regotiated for from the very beginning, that 
uc:s d 15% interest in the subject r-eal property. That 
property had been promised to him by all of the individual 
p~rLL~s involved. However, Mr. Ted Gubler and Mr. Stephen 
l.u\Jlcr attefilpted to negate those proraises by standing behind 
the e11Lities they had created, namely the Leslie Hilcox 
fan1ily Trust ar:d Steamboat Vista, Inc. to protect themselves 
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from liability and to e}:clude Tom Adams from t lie µrc,
1
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transaction in which he had been so intir;1atcly irivo[·,c~ 
Mr. Steven Carter stated: 
"Well, because basically Steamboat Vista, Leslie 
Wilcox Family Trust and, you know the whole - _ ., 
were dealing basically with the same people ~nd 
you know it was the intent that the money that ' 
was, you know disbursed, you knm-1, was for the 
same purpose. Steamboat Vista and Leslie Wilco;, 
Family Trust and Stephen Gubler and Ted Gubler 
were all the same parties." 
(TT, Page 115, Lines 7-13). 
Mr. Adams' impression of \vho he uas dealing witr, 
is best summed up by the following soliloquy; 
The answer necessarily has to be the lenr,th ot t> 
question. And the answer is, that it was 
difficult to know where they were Janci[lg, 
Sometimes we were dancing with Ted Gubler as Tee 
Gubler; sometimes we were dancing with Ted Guble'. 
as Si::eamboat Vista, through his son, Stephen 
Gubler; sometimes we were dancing with Ted Gublet 
as trustor - manager of the truc;t. So exhibit 2 
shows that I was endeavoring to demonstrate that 
whoever Ted Gubler is, I am buying land ancl 
dancing with him." (See TT, Page 82, Line 20 
through Page 83 Line 3). 
Findings on Validity of Corporation 
Several of the other findings of Fact found b;- ''' 
court, while unsubstantiated in the evidence, dealt with '"' 
corporation known as Steamboat Vista, Inc. The AppcllaM' 
objected specifically to Findings of Fact Nos. 26, ~I. 'i.', 
31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, and 43. Tlwc.c lt11c" 
dealt mainly with the facts surrounding the organL di Lnr 
Steamboat Vista, Inc., who organized it, who set it up, 
16 . .l 
1·1hich parties were principal= in it and with the issuance of 
sruck and the receipt of rnon2y for that stock in said 
corporation. 
Objection was made =o these Findings because they 
do not have evidentiary suppc;:-t. They do not reflect the 
role played by the corporatic~ in this complex transaction, 
nor do they reflect the deal~~gs the individual parties had 
one with another, nor the pu::Jose for which the corporation 
was set up. 
The organization o: Steamboat Vista, Inc. was 
proposed at an early stage, i~ the parties' dealings to 
purchase the subject propert::, for the purpose of providing 
a vehicle whereby the real eo:c.te could be purchased. Yet 
the corporatic~ was additione.lly proposed to allow 
flexibility in selling off i::-cerests in the property by 
selling shares of stock in a corporation instead of selling 
J direct real estate interes=. According to Steve Carter, 
the corporation was proposed isitially for tax reasons. 
(TT, Page 111). 
Tol'l ,\dams, Steven ·: e.rter and Stephen Gubler were 
instrumental in bringing this corporation into existence. 
lb~y were to be the original ~irectors and officers of the 
corporation according to the =esti~ony of Mr. Adams and Mr. 
C1aer. (TT, Pages 67, 110 =-~:c'. 127). Though the Articles 
ot Incorporation were not si;::-.ed until February of 1980, it 
j_ 7 
is readily apparent that the above-mentionc-d lnrlivill 11 :1 1. 
previously acted as if the corporation were al rt.:ddy iii 
existence. Mr. Carter stated that they had had severdl 
meetings during the period of time prior to rite corporaLc 
filing and that they had acted as a corporation and in the 
capacity of a corporation, although all of the legal 
formalities had not been completed. (TT, Page 111 and 128; 
Throughout these pre-incorporation meetings, the 
parties worked together and discussed how the corporation 
was going to operate, who would operate it, etc. It WdS 
during this period of time that the stock subscription 
agreements were signed by Stephen Gubler. Trial Exhibits 
Nos. 5 and 6. Under these subscriptions (which iippear in 
the appendix) Mr. Adams paid $7,500 as an initial depu•it 
for that stock or in the alternative for purchase of the 
subject real property. (See TT, Page 30). Mr. Adams 
indicated that he knew that the stock subscription 
agreements had some conditional language in them, namely 
that they were subject to the Board of Directors approval. 
However, he stated, " . . that did not concern me lic·c.1us1: 
I trusted these people and because I was to be a dirrcror 
and an officer and we 17ere moving a big project fc1n.1M 1: 
(TT, Page 67, Lines 10-12). Mr. Adams further e;C.1t~cl" 
regards to the conditional language pursuant to the q11 1 '-' 1 
if he knew that it was conditional, "If I had felt that in 
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ct!IY way, 1 would not have signed it and turned loose of my 
1r:onl'y, because I trusted these people. They were presented 
by my broker as honorable people." (TT, Page 68, Lines 
14-16). 
The condition in the stock purchase agreements 
stated, "This sale is subject: to board of direct:ors approval 
for sale of stock", Trial Exhibit Nos. 5 and 6. Tom Adams, 
Stephen Gubler and Steven Carter were to be on the initial 
board of directors. (TT, Pages 61, 67 and 127) As an 
initial director, Tom Adaras knew how he would vote in 
regards to the stock purchase agreements. Since Stephen 
Gubler signed those documents, he relied on his signature as 
an indication of how he would vote. Steven Carter never 
testified how he would vote, but his statements throughout 
his testimony seem to indicate that he would have voted to 
uphold the stock purchase agreements. He stated that the 
trust and the corporation and the Gublers were all the same 
parties and that all of the parties were working toward the 
joint purchase and ownership of the subject property. (TT, 
Page 115) Mr. Adams and Mr. Carter never actually became 
directors and Stephen Gubler voted against honoring the 
olock purchase agreements, which action is contrary to the 
original intent of the parties when the agreements were 
sir;ned. 
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The record shows that the Articles o! 
Incorporation uere filed on February 25, 19l\O, but tli'"c ti. 
Adams and Mr. Carter were not listed as beini; on the EoJlc 
of Directors. Stephen Gubler, his father Ted Gubler, dr1G 
Stephen Gubler's wife, Venla Gubler, were listed as the 
original Board of Directors. (Trial Exhibit No. 12) Afte• 
the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust had consurmnated a sale wich 
an outside investor, namely Everett Johnston, that Board 0; 
Directors took action against the Adams and unanimously 
agreed that they would not honor the stock subscription 
agreements. (Trial Exhibit No. 7) Mr. Everett Johnston hri 
come up with all the outside capital the Gublers needed tu 
invest in the subject real property. Mr. Johns ton receiveri 
a 50% interest in the land. Ted and Stephen Gubler no 
longer needed the Adams further participation, althouth 
$7 ,500.00 of the Adams money had already been used hy the 
Gublers in the downpayment, therefore they failed and 
refused to honor any of their commitments to them invoking 
the conditional language of the stock purchase agreement ~( 
the agreement to sell a lSZ interest in the prope~ty 
directly from the trust. The Gublers stated that Fverr,rt 
Johnston was unwilling to go through the corpor:itu•1• 1,itl· 
his investment. However, the record is void of dny '"' i' 
evidence that such was the case. Even if it was the L«-"· 
it should not prohibit the Adams from having their ])% 
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interest in the property. T~e negotiations of Tom Adams and 
Lhe Gublers, frorr. the very begi:rning assumed that due to the 
size of the project sufficie~: capital from outside 
investors was required to ma'.ze the project move forward. 
Gub1ers received the needed ca?ital from Mr. Johnston, 
however, instead of Adams, arcd at that point the Gublers 
systematically took steps to exclude the Adams from any 
further participation with t~e property. 
Appellants Money Csed in the Purchase 
Pursuant to the nego-:iations that Mr. Adams had 
involved himself in, he initially deposited $7,500 pursuant 
to the stock option agreemenc:s in Steamboat Vista, Inc. He 
subsequentally put up an additional $30,300 for purchase of 
stock in Steamboat Vista, Inc., or his interest in the 
subject property. (See TT, Page 3 7) . His intent all along 
was that he would enjoy ownership of a 15% interest in the 
subject propert:-'. Hr. Adams s::ated that the documents 
signed with the Leslie Wilcox ?amily Trust and with 
Steamboat Vista, Inc., were :o:: the purpose of making doubly 
sure that there would be no s:..ipup and that he, " ... was 
en tit. Led to buy this land". :'.r. Adams further stated, "I 
wanted to be certain that I ~o~ld have the participation 
µror1ised and urged upon me ir. the Graff Farm, because I 
thout;ht it was a reasonable ':J·-.:siness proposition." (See TT, 
'.'.l 
Page 40, Lines 12, and 23-25). Mr. Ad;rni,; L1te1- l•cl,·r, 1 , 
his payment of $30 ,300 to Southern Utah Title· c;,,lll\lrlli) 
payment for, "Purchase of 15% of E.J. Grdff Farm nc;ir 
Hurricane, Utah." (See TT, Page 73, Lines 23-2~). Mr 
Carter's testimony in regards to the $7, 500 indicate:; th,.r 
it was, "For the purchase of 15% interest in the total Gra:' 
Farm." (See TT, Page 112, Lines 9 and 10). 
The $7 ,500.00 that had been placed in Mr. Carter' 
trust account was later released to Stephen L. Gubler for 
the purpose of helping the Gublers pay the dovnf•ayment on 
the subject property and in Mr. Carter's words, "For is; 
ownership in the Graff Farm." (See TT, Page 113, Line J). 
Mr. Carter later stated that he thought the funds 1·1cn, uoc: 
as part of the earnest money that was put up by the Gublec, 
and the trust. (See TT, Page 114). Mr. Carter's posit10 1-
was later reiterated during the course of the trial when 
asked upon cross-examination Hhether he had refunded f'lolle" 
out of his trust account to Hr. Adams he stated, "Oh, l 
didn't have tlr. Adams money, it had already been tendered." 
(TT, Page 141, Lines 17-18). 
The testimony of Mr. Carter further clarifies trc 
fact that the Adams and the Gublers had planned on the 
participation from the very beginnins of their ncgut1cil 1u 11 
and the fact that each of the parties relied upon e.J•:l, 
others pronises, statements and the capital that h'1<l h•' 
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i>I "•1iJeJ hy the Adams when Mr. Carter stated, "Because the 
r~asun why they made the original earnest money was because 
,,f Tom Adams having an abundance of cash and they were 
assured they would be able to consummate the transaction." 
(TT, Page 144, Lines 10-13). It is noted that the Leslie 
\,J1 lcox Family Trust was che original party who posted the 
,·arnest money. 
lir. Carter, as the broker in this particular 
transaction, was instrumental in putting this entire large 
transaction together. In that regard, the Leslie Wilcox 
Family Trust had become an investor, the Adams had become 
investors and subsequentally Everett Johnston became an 
investor. Mr. Carter stated that he informed Mr. Everett 
Johnston of the investment possibility in the real property. 
(TT, rage 120). The Gublers and Adams needed additional 
capital from outside investors in order to purchase the 
property. 
There is no doubt but that the $7,500 invested by 
i'iL. Tom Adams v;ent towards the purchase of the subject 
property. Mr. Stephen Gubler and Mr. Ted Gubler both stated 
that the money was applied towards the downpayment and the 
rurchase of the Graff Farm. (See TT, Pages 208 and 252). 
Th'-' trustee Glen Gubler stated that he initially thought 
th.it chc $7,500.00 had gone towards purchase of the subject 
prupc·rty, but that he had found out since that time that 
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those funds had not been used for the subject proµertv 
stated that the funds had been used in an entirely scp<1c 
purchase and that he had been given that informati 011 liy 
Stephen Gubler. (TT, Page 180). The later statements ol 
Mr. Stephen Gubler indicating that the money had gone 
towards the purchase of the Graff farm indicate his doub!P 
dealing with the Adams and his attempt to convince the 
trustees that the Adams were legally not entitled to receive 
a portion of the subject property. 
The Appellants conclusion objected to a major 
portion of the court's Findings of Fact for good reason 
those Findings of Fact were unsupported by the evidence 
presented during trial. The Appellants citatic>ris to the 
trial transcript accurately and adequately show the 
overwhelming weight of evidence. Such errurs are f~tal tr' 
the lower court's Conclusions of Law and ultimate judgment. 
The facts, as they were truly presented, are totally 
contrary to the Conclusions drawn and judgment rendered 
POINT II. THE LESLIE WILCOX FA!llLY TRUST IS 
INVALID 
A. The Leslie Hilcoz Family Trust is Lhe alcer 
ego of Ted Gubler. 
The evidence on the trust shO\vS it is ''"] .· 1 1,,. 
alter ego of Defendant Ted Gubler. 
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The theory of the 2lter ego doctrine and of 
pi~rcing the corporate veil has long been a part of the law 
1 iL cur pu.ratior1s. In discussin6 this concept, the 
commentators and courts have usually placed themselves in 
the context of corporate law. However, the alter ego 
doctrine is also applicable to other areas of the law where 
one person has apparently pu: himself beyond the reach of 
his creditors while at the sa~e time retaining the benefits 
and enjoyment of the propertv he has purportedly conveyed 
out of his personal name. 
An early Utah Suprece Court case, in addressing 
rhe alter ego doctrine, stateC.: "It would be a mere travesty 
of justice if courts could or should refuse to look behind 
Lhe men: form of a transaction in order to ascertain the 
real truth, and reach and hole responsible the real parties 
in interest." \'estern Securities Company v. Spiro, 62 Utah 
G23, 221 P. 856 (1923). This case also cited the case of 
liunrer v. Baker Moc:or Vehicle Co., (D.C.) 225 Fed. 1006 
which held that the separate e~tity of a corporation may be 
,hsregarded where it "is so or;anized and controlled, and 
iLs a[(airs are so conducted; as to make it merely an 
instru~1entality or adjunct cf 2nother corporation." Ibid. 
;ir 85Y. The Utah Court agreec · ..;ich a Washington Court's 
,1r1<c ly'.>is in Spokane Merchants' Association v. Clere Clothing 
Cl!111'~· 84 \lash. 616, 147 P. 414; where it stated that 
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"Courts no longer hesitate to look through form' Lo 
substance, and ignore a mere colorable corporaLe etHlty "' 
the end that rights of third parties &hall be proL~~LL~ 
The Utah case of Geary v. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P.2d 3Yo 
(1932) also held that courts will ignore form and look t(, 
substance in holding shareholders as the real parties in 
interest: to prevent fraud, to redress wrong, to do justiee. 
Thus the rule is that the corporate entity may be entirel;· 
disregarded in order to reach and protect the real pztrties 
in interest and to disclose the real transaction. The s0rr,e 
theory and analysis should apply to trusts. 
There are basically two requirements thdt need cc 
be met before the alter ego doctrine applies. The first 
element requires such unity of interest and ovrnership thar 
the separate personalities of the corporation and the 
individual no longer exist. The second element is, that ii 
the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, ir 
would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequic~~ 
result would follow. Automotriz Del Golfo de Califocnia 
S.A. De C. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1 (California, 1957); 
Norman v. Murray First Thrift and Loan Company, 596 P.2d 
1028 (1979). 
Several cases outline actions which woul \I 111'· 1 t: 
a court in holding that the corporation is the allct c;' 
one or a number of shareholders: Amoss v. Bennion, 18 Utcdi 
2d 251, 420 P.2d 47 (1966); Grover v. Garn, 23 Uuih 2cl 44i, 
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1,611 P. 2d 598 ( 1970); State v. Voremus, 29 Utah 2d 373, 510 
P.2d 526 (1973); Foster v. Blake Heights Corporation, 530 
F./J DlS (Ucah 1974). 
In the Amoss case the defendant had signed a 
contract dealing with the sale of land and livestock. He 
had signed personally and as president of a corporation. 
\-/hen he questioned his authority to bind the corporation 
which technically held title to the property, the court 
said: " . the record pretty clearly reflects that the 
corporation was his alter ego, he having full control with 
no one in a position to object to his transactions, nor to 
offend him. We think and hold that the record indicates a 
one man operation and a ratification of his actions. 
Consequently the corporation defendant would have to respond 
as would he, to his commitments and of necessity equal 
obeisance to the trial court's judgment." The Grover case 
agreed <·1ith 19 C.J.S. Corporations, §1004, p.471, "***but 
Lhe trend of authority is to uphold as binding on the 
corporation acts for contracts on its behalf by a person or 
persons owning all or practically all the stock." The 
Crover court further stated that, "Some incorporators so 
r~rfectly fashion the structure and performance of a 
c oq1orate entity to that of their individual personality 
thac it is honestly said the corporate entity is the alter 
ego of the natural person who designed it." 
27 
Hhen the allegations and evidence slw··.1 thJt. , 
alter ego doctrine should apply, courts will (>hs,·r11,, tt:c 
conduct of persons who control and rrwnipuLllc: cl"' c .. ,,~,, 1 , 
business. The State v. Voremus court said thdt the alter 
ego doctrine in commonly applied to "one man corporatioils" 
that is, where one man owns practically all of the stork, 
either directly or through others who hold it for his use 
and benefit, and where the stockholder uses the corporatinc
1 
as a shield to protect him from debts or wrongcloing, lt r,,,.; 
also apply where the shareholder is so closely allied with 
the corporation through ownership and r;ianagement as to 
enable the court to see clearly that the corporate entity i· 
but a sham and it is the stockholder who is doing business 
behind the corporate shield. 
The Foster and Grover cases also discussed an 
estoppel theory and how shareholders, by their acts and 
statements or where the corporation has invested its office· 
or agent with actual or ostensible authority with kn<r.;leoge 
that the third party will or does in fact rely thereoll, 1:i 
be bound by such representations. Black's Law Dicti.nnan 
as quoted in Grover, at 477; states "An estoppel by the 
conduct of admissions of a party -,': it is, and ;1 l\-1d«' 
was, a familiar principle in the law of contr:1ct.s. ]t I 
at the foundation of morals and is a cardinal point 
exposition of promises, that one shall be bound by the sLD'• 
of facts which he had induced another to act upon." 
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The facts in this case show that the Leslie Wilcox 
lar.1ily Trust is Ted Gubler's alter ego. Ted Gubler 
c~~rcL~es such pussessiun and control over the trust 
properties that they are indistinguishable from any assets 
or obligations he may hold personally. The trust was 
created July 15, 1973, TT, Page 241, Line 20. At the 
creation of the trust Ted Gubler transferred all his 
property, both real and personal, to the trust. Yet almost 
seven years later Mr. Gubler still refers to the trust 
property as "my home" 2nd "all the property that I've always 
had", (Deposition of Ted Gubler , at Page 6.) The trustees 
of the Les lie \.Ji lco}: Family Trust are merely a rubber stamp 
for the decisions made by Ted Gubler. In his deposition, 
\1hen :isked about the purchase of the Graff Farm, Mr. Gubler 
replied, ". so we met with our trustees and told them 
what we would like them to do." Ted Gubler Deposition, at 
Page 8. Jean Cox was asked if she had ever acted 
independently of the decisions of Ted or Stephen Gubler, she 
stated, "I don't recall. I may have. I don't know." Jean 
Cox Deposition, at Page 18. Glen Gubler was asked ". 
you arc called upon, then, mainly to sign documents 
r·.1l i fying the decisions of the manager, is that correct?", 
'.-'l th the answer, "Right." Glen Gubler Deposition, at Page 
0 ~; ~c:ec also TT, Pages 165 and l 75. Glen Gubler also stated 
that Ted Gubler makes all the day to day management type of 
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decisions with regard to the trust property, .:md tlic1L 1" 
never disagreed with Ted Gubler' s decisions in reg;i 11 1 t" 
trust property. TT, Page 17). Tile statements In<lue ai'l"•c 
the depositions of the respective Defendants are sioila, 
content to the facts as stated in Point I of this Argument 
as they were brought out during the trial of this matter. 
B. The creation of the Leslie Wilcox Family 
Trust was a fraudulent conveyance by the 
trustor, Ted L. Gubler. 
The general rule as stated in 37 CJS Fraudulent 
Conveyances is that both at common law and under statute J 
person cannot settle his estate in trust for his own 
benefit, so as to be free from his liability for his debts. 
The intention of the parties to such a transfer, whether 
honest or fraudulent, is wholly immaterial. The rule is 
based on the self-evident proposition that a man's propert\ 
should be subject to the payment of his debts, although he 
has vested a nominal title thereto in some other person. le 
is not necessary that the instrument specifically state the 
the property is in trust for the use of the gr an tor, but, 1' 
such is the legal effect as gathered from its language, tk 
court will, as a matter of law, declare it void. 1'he 
important fact is that the property is actually '"'"·.c:., 11 
trust for the use of the person transferring the pru1•cr 11 
whether or not the trust declaration is open or secret, and 
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•1h,.ther or not it is expressed in the conveyance or is the 
,uhject of a private understanding. Even though the 
trustees have unlimited discretion, it will not take the 
case out of the general rule. 
Utah law is in accord with this general rule. 
Utah Code Ann. §25-1-11 (1953, as amended) states: 
All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers or 
assignments, verbal or written, of goods, 
chattels, or things in action made in trust for 
the use of the person making the same shall be 
void as against the existing or subsequent 
creditors of such person. 
The section relates to transfers of personal property, but 
the Utah SupreCTe Court, in Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241 
(Utah 1975) held that this "statute is but a codification of 
the common law, which for reasons discussed herein, refused 
to give recognition to trusts of this character involving 
any kind of property." Leach at 1244. According to 37 CJS 
Fraudulent Conveyances §62 the term "creditor" has been 
construed very liberally, so as to include all persons who 
have accounts, claims, demands, interests, or causes of 
action for which they are entitled to recover any debt, 
<l~P1,1c1i, penalty or forfeiture, and who may be hindered, 
d1 layed, or defrauded by such conveyances. Again Utah law 
J" in accord with the general rule. Utah Code Ann. §25-1-1 
rJ'l'l3, as amended) states that a creditor is, "a person 
li,n·i"g <my claira, whether matured or unCTatured, liquidated 
c•r unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent." 
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The intent and effect of §25-1-11 is st.itd J" 
Leach to be, "to prevent a person from usin1: o crusL 
device by which he can retain for hir:1self and enjoy 
substantially all of the advantages of ownership and <lt the 
same time place it beyond the legitimate claims of his 
creditors. Ibid. at 1243; and authorities therein cited. 
Ted Gubler is in the physical possession of mu~h 
of the property he transferred to the trust. When a 
transferor retains possession of the property transferred. 
it is conclusive evidence of fraud. See Johnson et. al v. 
Emery, 31 Utah 126, 86 P. 869 ( 1906); Charleston Co-op v. 
W. Allen & Bros., 40 Utah 575, 123 P. 578 (1912); Utah Code 
Ann. §25-1-14 (1953, as amended). Another Utah case helC 
that all transfers must be accompanh:d with fair 
consideration, if not and the person is thus insolvent it;, 
fraudulent, regardless of intent. Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 
198, 48 P.2d 513 (1935). It has also been held that 
conveyances between close relatives are subject to rigid 
scrutiny, but are not ipso facto fraudulent. In detero11Di 1c> 
whether a conveyance is fraudulent as to creditors, rhz·1 
fact r,1ust be determined from the facts of each case cJncl fee· 
the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Ned J_ 
Bowmand Company v. White, 12 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.;'cl %' 
(1962). 
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In cases from surr:~nding states, the courts have 
1,,., 11 ill basic agreement with :he principles discussed above. 
\11 Arizona Bc;rck v. Morris, 6 . \riz. App. 566, 435 P.2d 73 
1\967), the court stated tha: under the cormnon law which has 
b~cn adopted by statute in Arizona, any trust settled for 
rhe benefit of the settler io unenforceable as against the 
creditors of the settlor, no:-.-1ithstanding the lack of 
fraudulent intent on the par: of the settler. The Oregon 
Supreme Court stated that on:=s property should be subject to 
payment of his debts, althou~i he has vested a nominal title 
thecero in some other persoL. If a trust is for the settler 
for his life with a power in :he settler to appoint the 
remainder interest to others. he may be held to be the 
dbsolutc owner of the trust :roperty and his creditors may 
reach it. Johnson v. Commec::.al Bank, 284 Or. 675, 588 P.2d 
109ii (1978). In the Kansas c=.se of Herd v. Chambers, 158 
K2n. 614, 149 P.2d 583 (194L , the court stated that one 
cannot create out of his owE ?roperty for his own benefit a 
trust and thereby defeat the lawful demands of his 
r1Pd1Lors, even though no fre~d is intended. 
Ted Gubler has exer:ed tremendous control over the 
'.L11ct, to the extent that it c.ppears that the property is 
drlually his own and that he =an do whatever he pleases with 
i1 When asked what Ted Gub:er's duties as manager were, 
l.d!'rele Orton said, "\Jell, gee, I guess what a manager does; 
Y< 1t1 loo!~ after your~roc:ertv or the share of whatever 
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he's managing on the business end of it." (cn:ph, 1 ·:i~ 
LaPrele G. Orton Deposition at Page 12, ,;cc "b" n, 
198, Linc 18. Glen Gubl,~r stated thac he W<i~ LdLlell 
mainly to sign documents ratifying the decisillns of 'led 
Gubler and that it was Ted Gubler who made all the 
day-to-day management-type decisions with regacd to trust 
property. Glen Gubler Deposition at Pages 21-72. When 
Cox was asked whether it was common for Ted Cubler to sigu 
documents as manager for the trust, she replied, "\.Jell, I 
guess where we've discussed them, and maybe he felt this'·" 
-- where he had already discussed these things 1.;ith us, tk 1 
was all right. I wasn't aware of it." J can Cox Dcpositior 
at Page 12. Ted Gubler also authorized his sun Stephen 
Gubler tu endorse the check, marked and received as E·:l;il11: 
3 during the trial, as an agent of the Leslie \Jilco:; FJni. 
Trust. Ted Gubler Deposition at Pages 19-20. Sef also~:. 
Page 252. Yet the trustees didn't even know thJt Stepher 
Gubler could act as such an agent. LaPrele Orton was osk1• 
if Stephen Gubler was an agent of the trust and she 
answered, "I don't know." LaPre le Orton Deposit ion at P"t' 
13. Jean Cox stated that she found out after the L1ct tha: 
Stephen Gubler had endorsed the check as all agent of the 
trust. Jean Cox Deposition at Pages 13-14. See alcc1 ': 
Pages 162, 163, and 197. LaPrele Orton did not kncJ\'7 
the $114,158.34 went which was due Lo the tru:ot from the 
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s:ile oi the property to E\·erett Johnston, what property was 
in the trust, or whether an:,, financial records were kept. 
LaPrele Orton Deposition at Pages 15, 18 and 19. See also 
'1 'l' !1 ctgC: 19 /. 
Ted Gubler's stateLents also indicate his control 
over the trust and trust property. He indicated that he 
voted to bring new trustees into the trust. Ted Gubler 
Deposition at Page 4, and on Page 6 he still refers to the 
trust property as "my home" and "all the property I've 
always had." At Page 8, Mr. Gubler, in discussing the 
possihle purchase of the Graf: Farm, stated, "So we met with 
our trustees and told them •,.;hat we would like them to do." 
Again, the state~ents from the Defendants' 
depositions coincide with the facts presented during the 
trial of the above-entitled case. 
The Trust Agreement itself al~o shows that the 
creation of the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust was a fraudulent 
conveyance by the trustor. ~rial Exhibit No. 21. In 
paragraph 25 of said agree~ent, the settlors of the trust 
exchanged all of their property for 100 certificates of 
beneficial interest in the trust. This is exactly the 
iT<rnsaction that the above cases and argument have 
continually declared void. It would be irrelevant what the 
•ettlors subsequently did with the certificate of beneficial 
interest, at the time of the creation of the trust the 
settlors had placed all their property in trust and had 
retained the beneficial interest in themselves. 
Leach v. Anderson case, supr~, the court held th"r ivhtthe· 
trust should be regard.cc!. as ut1e cteatcc!. for ci1e u .. ~ """ 
benefit of the trustor and thus void as against exisrin~ , 
subsequent credit:ors of the trustor is to be deterrnin 2 r1 
what the trustor had a right t:o take under its terms duric 
his or her lifetime, rather than upon what he or she h2 s 
actually used therefrom. Paragraphs 2 and 4 of the rrust 
agreement provide that the holders of the beneficial 
certificat:es will be entitled to distribution of trust 
corpus for purposes of education, health, emergency st:p; 
and maintenance, or to maintain their accustomed st2nd'1rJ 
living. Paragraph 17 provides for the annual clistrihurir' 
of all ordinary income to the holders of beneficial 
certificates. The settlors may be trustees or employees c: 
the trust and would be entitled to be paid a salary dud t· 
be insured. See Paragraphs 15, 19 and 29. These pr1l'_,i,ir 
all provide for some retention of the benefiLs in the 
settlors. 
The facts and circumstances of this case sho .. 1' 
the settlor of the Leslie \/ilco;.,, Family Trust allcmplt•i 
put all his property behind the shield of a trust 
instrument, while at the same t:ime retaining all the 
benefits and enjoyment that that property had r,iven hii 
before the conveyance. The r:icrits and intent of such" 
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rr1nsfer are not argued here, but it is argued that any such 
rr;,tiofer operates as a fraudulent conveyance as against the 
cr""sicror's existing and future creditors. 
POINT II I: THE CONDITION "SUBJECT TO TRUSTEES' 
WRITTEN OKAY" IS INVALID As A CONDITION 
PRECEDENT 
The effect of correct factual findings and the 
application of the doctrines in Point II, above, is to void 
the "conditions" in the documents. 
A. The "condition" is illusory. 
This supposed condition precedent i.e. "Subject to 
Trustees' \frit;::en Okay", found in Trial Exhibit No. 2, is 
merely illusory and an attempt by Ted Gubler to shield 
himself from the consequences of his written contract. Ted 
Gubler acted as manager of the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust 
dnd in that capacity he made the daily management type 
Jecisions for the trust. He was also, along with his son 
Stephen, instrumental in the negotiations for the purchase 
dud sale of the Graff Farm. He and his son gave their 
advice to the trustees of the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust and 
tbe trustees seemed to always follow such advice. Glen 
C:ubler stated th.at he had never denied Ted Gubler permission 
t '' buy or sell property. Deposition of Glen Gubler, Page 
.} Jean Cox stated that she didn't know if she had ever 
Jenied such permission before. Deposition of Jean Cox, Page 
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18. Ted Gubler stated that he did not knmv uf c"1c: Ui't 
where the trustees had ever denied one of his u'q11 1 01 :, 
252. 
B. The "condition" was exercisable only in Lac 
aith. 
Ted Gubler signed an agree!I'ent with Tom Addms 
promising that the Leslie Wilcox Far.iily Trust would con ·e: 
15% interest in the Graff Farm to the Adams. Yet Mr. Gd'., 
then advises the trustees not to sell to tlr. i\dnms but tc. 
Everett Johnston, which sale was consurrunated in March of 
1980. TT, Pages 245-247. Such double dea 1 ing and bdd f,' 
on the part of Ted Gubler c1nnot be looLed upon li;_;hrly 
this Court. 
C. Equity shoulc': dispense with the conclitio". 
The noted scholar on contract law, i\rthur L. 
Corbin, states in his volume, Corbin on ConLracts, thac < 
"court must determine when justice requires dispc:nsing 1•i: 
a condition as wel 1 as when to find one, either express " 
constructive." Corbin, Corbin on Cc.:ntracts, 1 Vol Eci., 
Publishing Co., (1975) section 649. It is manifest in the 
case that justice can be served only by the court decl:«i· 
the purported condition in this contrnct to be uf l'U "'''' 
In furtherance of this point Corbin scirc:, rli· 
"one who unjustly prevents the performance or thl' h;iµpc '' 
of a condition of his own promissory duty thereby eli1uC1'' 
i 
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il JS such a condition. He will not be pennitted to take 
;id'.·a11tage of his own wrong, and to escape from liability for 
, ,,, rc0 ;,dc:i.·ing his proDised performance Ly preventing the 
haf>pening of the condition on which it was promised." Ibid 
Section 767. See also, Dupont DeNemours Powder G. v. 
~chlott~an, 218 F. 363 (2nd Cir., 1914); Camden v. Jarrett, 
154 F. 788 (4th Cir., 1907). The Leslie Wilcox Family Trust 
would not be wrong for refusing to perform the contract, 
except for the fact that the nonperformance of the condition 
was unjustly caused by Ted Gubler, its manager. Mr. 
Gublcr's actions prevented the performance of the condition, 
thus the subsequent refusal to perform the contract is a 
hreach of the same. "Prevention eliminates the condition, 
for purposes of remedy." Ibid. 
D. Good Faith Obligation 
In the Utah case of Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 
34~ (Utah 1980) the court stated that when parties entered 
into contracts, such as for the purchase of real property, 
. it is to be assumed t~at they will cooperate with 
each other in good faith for its performance Ibid at 
347. See also, Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1910). In this last cited case the court also states the 
''pruposition that the parties to a contract are obliged to 
proceed in good faith to cooperate in perforuing the 
contract in accordance with its expressed intent . [O]ne 
rarty to a contract cannot by willful act or omission make 
39 
it impossible O"." difficult for the other tu pcrfon, 1 ,,r .' 
make the other's non-performance as a def c'nse." ~ .. 
859. See also ?ischer v. Johnson, 525 l'.;'J 4) (i«d, 
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of 6ooc 
and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcemem" 
Restatement, 2nd, Contracts Tentative Draft (1976), §21'. 
In the comments to §231 it is stated that "Good faith 
performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes 
faithfulness to an agreed comraon purpose and consistency 
with the justified expectations of the other party; * 
Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good 
faith in performance even though the actor believes his 
conduct to be justified. 
E. The condition is excused. 
A party to a contract may not be bound to 
necessarily take positive action to bring about the 
performance of a condition, but it has been held that 
"active conduct of a conditional promisor preventing or 
hindering the :ulfillment of the condition elir:linates it 
makes the proc:'..se absolute." 17 Am.Jur. 2nd, Crmtracr' 
§§361 and 427. See also, Amies v. \Jesnofske, 2S'l N.Y. fr 
174 N.E. 1,)6, 73 ALR 918 (1931). The Restau11u1c, 
Contracts, §295 and Corbin, §769 state that the pt!rti>, 
of a condition may be excused by the promisor'b hinJ, 
was well as by his prevention of said condition. Ith"' 
been shown tha;: the trustees of the Leslie \hlcox Faciilv 
I 
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, rust 1-.1 n.: merely the 'rubber stamps' of the decisions made 
1,_,, 'lr·rl and Stephen Gubler, and that these men did in fact 
ruu Lhc affairs in regards to all of the trust property. In 
Weber Meadow-View Corporation v. Wilde, 575 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
1g78), the court stated that a party who enters into a 
contract must cooperate in good faith to carry out the 
intentions of the parties and that one party cannot engaged 
in any subterfuge or devious means to prevent the other 
party from performing, and then using that as his excuse for 
failing to keep his own commitments. 
F. Examples of court eliminated conditions. 
In some more refined areas of the law, it has been 
held that contractual conditions will be eliminated due to 
one party's bad faith. In contracts conditional on the 
grcinting of "permits", if one party causes the granting 
authority to refuse the "permit", an action for damages for 
Lrcach of contract is maintainable. Corbin, supra, §83. 
There are also contracts which are conditioned upon an 
expert giving a certificate as to the completeness of 
certain contracts. In this type of contract courts will not 
giv~ effect to such express conditions if the expert's 
tc•fusal is not "in good faith." Thus the contract is 
·11forccable without the condition. It is unanimously agreed 
t ktL ;:i condition \vill be eliminated if its non-performance 
i~ the result of the fraudulent collusion of the expert and 
lhie contracting party. Conscious and neglectful ignorance 
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of the facts may not be as bad as an intentional 
misrepresentation of facts known to exist, b11L is 
eliminate the condition. 
an expert's opinion, fraud and bad faith exist if the C·,p,· 
fails and refuses t:o exal'.line the performance. ~ \6). 
This same rule is also stated in Restat:ernent, Contracts 
§303, which is quoted in Corbin on Contracts. 
The conditional contract signed by Ted Gubler 
presently valid and enforceable, t:he condition being 
eliminated due to 'led Gubler' s bad faith and double de"1 
with Toru Adams. 
G. Conditions in corpora re documents. 
lt is stated here, that the condition 1v-rittc11 
the stock subscript ion agreements signed by '.; tcphen G 1~ble: 
and Tom Adams is also excused, the above argument being 
exactly applicable to these contracts. Stephen Gubler 
exhibited his bad faith when he voted as a director of 
Steamboat Vista, Ir,c., not to sell stock to the Ad;ims 
pursuant to the subscription contracts he had earlier 0 1~ 1 
as an incorpor a tor of that corp oration. It is evident U'· 
all the parties \'/ere initially trying to arrang,e a meclki. 
by which the Graff Farm could be purchased by poolint, th· 
assets of several parties. The bad faith and inside '' 
of Ted and Stephen Gubler become even more i1pparc11L .1 
tried to squeeze the Adams out of the transaction enL ii,' 
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;,) 1 the: parcics had been very agreeable on allowing the 
I Jaint:iffs a 15% interest in the farm when ready cash was 
'''· c .en'. c>iHl tic. Aci:lFlS b<.1d s·:ich cash readily available. Yet, 
uhen another purchaser was found who had even more available 
ta~h co l<.1y down, the Gublers began to systematically eject 
the Appellants from the deal entirely. Ted Gubler used his 
influence to keep the trustees from giving their written 
consent to the contract he signed, and also voted as a 
director of Sceamboat Vista, Inc., not to sell stock to the 
Adi!!l:s. The result being, tha c through the Gublers' actions, 
the Adams were left with nothing after all their 
net;oriations and after having put up almost $38,000.00. The 
Cublers retained the Plaintiffs' 15% of the Farrn for 
themselves. This Court:, in justice, cannot sanction or 
defend this result. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants have shmm that the trial court made 
drasti~ and substantial errors in its Findings of Fact. The 
evidence is undisputed that the Leslie Wilcox Family Trust 
dnd Ted Gubler were one and the same insofar as ownership of 
ell" property of the trust was concerned. They further show 
1 l1dt the representations made by Ted Gubler in behalf of the 
t tllst. were as if they were f'lade in his behalf solely and 
tliar Tom Adams was justified in his reliance upon Ted 
Culiler 's \ffitteri documents. Torn Adams was involved with the 
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purchase of the subject property from the early he~i,1'ti 
of any negotiations for the purchase of that pruµeny. 
\·Jhether that purchase was to be consunu;tat<eu throu,~h tiir-
trust agreement, the corporate entity or as an outright 
purchase, the contemplation of all parties concerned was 
that they would all provide capital for that venture and 
would all share an undivided ownership interest in the ieci 
property. The corporate entity that was established was 
merely one vehicle by which they had proposed to accomplisr 
that end objective. Mr. Adams' investment into the stock 
purchase agreement was the same as if he had made the 
investment into the property itself. The Gublers' later 
refusals to honor the stock purchase agreement or the 
agreement of the trust was brought about in bad faith and 
should not defeat the Adams right to share in the benefitt 
of property ownership. 
This Court should reverse the lower court's 
decision and direct that judgment be entered in behalf,,[ 
Henry Thomas Adams and Henry Thomas Adams III requiring ti· 
Defendani::s to convey a 15% interest in the subject proptr' 
to the Appellants, and for partition of the property. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2-:zfkl_ day of 
November, 1983. 
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Snow & Nuffer 
A Professional Corporation 
/ .•, . /I/ ./ . ,Jl I /'' I I By '1 '11;1: i ' / v ,~:cAJtt:c 
LaMar J \ · war 
Attorney for Appellants 
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